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Abstract 
Portugal has had a strong public works policy for centuries. In recent years, the 
largest environmental conflicts were focused precisely on public works. Two case 
studies are hereby examined. The third crossing of the Tagus at Lisbon should 
support the high-speed rail link between Lisbon and Madrid, plus suburban and 
heavy cargo trains; recently, the Government decided to add a road. But Lisbon 
already suffers from too much traffic and air pollution; and the cost is too high, 
because project-finance is not viable; instead, more and better public transportation 
is needed. A policy for large dams aims to create 12 new dams, supposedly to 
reduce GHG emissions and improve the balance of the electric network; 
unfortunately, those dams will hinder regional development in poor regions, destroy 
the last major wild rivers in Portugal and a number of social infrastructures; they 
would generate 2 TWh/year of electricity, about 1% of energy demand in Portugal, at 
a cost of 3 000 M€; in contrast, the same investment in energy-efficiency projects 
would save at least 8 TWh/year. In both cases, the decision process was aprioristic 
and disregarding of public opinion. In short, public works in Portugal remain as 
unsustainable as ever, environmentally, socially and economically. 
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1. The practical meaning of sustainability 
The conventional definition of sustainability, from the Brundtland Report (WCED 
1987), states “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs”. At the time, this concept represented a major change of paradigm, from a 
previous concept of development that was solely based on the accretion of wealth. 
The Report makes the compelling case that conservation of natural resources and 
social and economic development are not antagonic, but rather complementary and 
inter-dependent. This also represented a profound conceptual change: throughout 
the 19th and early 20th centuries, there was a pervading idea that Man was capable 
and entitled to “conquer” Nature. Even after Nature conservation became a major 
public issue in the mid-20th century, most people believed that environmental 
degradation was an inescapable (if disagreeable) cost of economic progress. 
By 1992, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, in Rio 
de Janeiro, sustainability was heralded as the new paradigm that reconciled 
economy, society and environment, and would shape development into the 21st 
century. Unfortunately, this vision proved to be much too optimistic. 
There was certainly progress made in the past two decades. Sustainability now 
pervades the political discourse, the law and the goals of public institutions, 
companies and NGO alike. Environmental issues became a real concern for many 
citizens around the world. On paper, sustainability appears to be indeed the new 
paradigm; and despite all critics, so far no better paradigm has emerged. 
Putting the concept to practice, however, is a very different thing. Indicators such as 
emission of greenhouse gases, degradation of biodiversity, number of poor and 
refugees in the world, have not been curbed despite new policies and commitments.  
Actual application of a sustainable development has been hindered by a number of 
problems: 
- The sustainability concept is too broad to serve as a guide on how to get 
there, from our present very unsustainable society; 
- The sustainability concept is certainly meaningful in the long term, but conflicts 
may arise in the short term, and major decisions are often determined by 
short-term preoccupations (personal welfare in families, profit in business, 
expectations of voters in politics); 
- Most decision-makers do not in fact understand the sustainability concept, or 
the underlaying relations between economics, society and environment; they 
often choose their preferred side of sustainability (usually social or economic) 
and pursue that one alone; 
- Assessment of progress towards sustainability has been tentative at best. It 
has often taken the form of declarations, intentions, procedures and reporting 
of efforts rather than performance evaluation. Tools such as the Sustainable 
Dow-Jones Index, the ISO 14000 family of standards and impact assessment 
legislation are cases in point: they show a path and a method, but they do not 
demand actual performance. Only recently has the use of social and 
environmental performance indicators improved, thanks to work by 
organizations like OECD, UNECE, UNDP, European Environment Agency, US 
Environmental Protection Agency, Global Reporting Initiative and Redefining 
Progress, among others. 
- Politics and business are, as ever, the “art of the possible”. Often, the 
“possible” is whatever demanded by the strongest, richest or more vocal 
stakeholders. The poor, the future generations and Nature have no voice of 
their own and precious few advocates, hence they often get no more than the 
“crumbles of the banquet”. 
To help clarify the meaning of sustainability, two images are hereby proposed: 
- “Future generations” is too diffuse a goal. We should focus on passing on to 
our children and grandchildren the unspoiled wonders and resources of our 
planet. Let our grandchildren be proud of their grandfathers; 
- “Sustainability” may be seen as a tripod of social, ecologic and economic 
goals: all three legs of the tripod must be in good shape, or else the whole 
thing falls apart. 
To uphold sustainability in the real world, the author suggests three critical 
guidelines: 
- Leaders and decision-makers in government, business, science and NGO 
must be educated in sustainability, as must citizens at large (that is one goal 
of MSKE); 
- So called “development projects” must be evaluated in the light of 
sustainability principles, not on mere due diligence (this is the subject of this 
paper); 
- Market forces must be put to work in favour of social and ecologic goals, by 
means e.g. of internalization of costs in the economy and environmental tax 
reforms (this is somewhat outside the scope of this paper, but important as a 
reference framework). 
Sustainability is a useful but also a very difficult paradigm to follow. This paper 
discusses the practical application of the concept to public works in Portugal. 
2. Public works policy in Portugal 
Public works have many benefits, but also the potential to create major 
environmental impacts, as indeed often happened in the past. The largest 
environmental conflicts in Portugal in the last twenty years were focused, not on 
polluting industry, but on public works (LPN, 2009).  
Portugal has had a strong national public works policy for over 150 years. Railway 
dominated public works in the second half of the 19th century, large dams throughout 
the 20th century, motorways and waste treatment plants in the past few decades. 
Decision-makers and the general public became used to the notion that public works 
are of course good things, and moreover they give votes to whoever inaugurates 
them. Portugal is home to the Guinness Records-awarded longest “feijoada” in the 
world, a table set for thousands, at the inauguration of the Vasco da Gama bridge on 
the Tagus estuary in 1998. 
It should be said that Portugal enacted in 1987 one of the first framework laws on the 
Environment, it is a signatory to most major environmental international conventions, 
has a comparatively large fraction of its territory designated under EU Natura 2000 
Network (21%). Public opinion has been more and more aware of environmental 
issues (Eurobarometer 2005). It might thus be expected that increasing 
environmental legislation and awareness would help to steer modern decision-
making on public works towards a more sustainable path. This may have happened 
in some fields, but definitely not in the matter of public works. 
In the past twenty years the discourse has changed dramatically, as has the 
information base, but not the decision-making approach. The author and others have 
previously examined public works decision processes in Portugal, e.g. the second 
crossing of the Tagus at Lisbon, decided in 1992, inaugurated in 1998 (Melo 2000) 
and the Alqueva dam and irrigation project, decided in 1994, inaugurated in 2002 
(Melo and Janeiro 2005). In those instances, as in many others, essential decisions 
were taken before proper environmental impact assessment was conducted, 
although major environmental and social impacts were recognized. The reasons 
invoked for those decisions were of social and economic character (some of them 
later shown to be unsupported). Those projects were among the worst environmental 
conflicts of the past twenty years in Portugal. 
The Portuguese Government has announced plans for a number of major public 
works to be constructed in the next few years: 12 large dams, several motorways, the 
third Tagus crossing at Lisbon, the high speed railway Porto-Lisbon-Badajoz and the 
new Lisbon airport, among others. If they all went forward, the investment would 
amount to about 15 000 M€ (almost 15% of Portuguese GDP). 
The official discourse is now much more concerned with environment; in fact, 
environment has begun to be used as an excuse to advance environment-damaging 
public works. This paper examines this problem focusing on two case studies 
currently undergoing hot debate: the National Program on Large Hydropower Dams 
and the Third Crossing of the Tagus at Lisbon. These case studies have been 
selected for a combination of reasons: (i) they are supposed to reduce energy 
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions — a central issue of environmental 
policy — but create more environmental problems than they solve; (ii) they are 
purported to have social and economic benefits, but that hope is contradicted by hard 
data; (iii) they are paradigmatic of an approach to decision-making that can be 
described in a nutshell as “decide first, discuss after and study later”; (iv) they are still 
far from closed. In short, they are unsustainable projects on all counts, but debate 
over them may prevent some of the foreseen damages. 
3. Energy policy in Portugal 
Portugal is one of the European countries with worse energy indicators (Table 1). 
Table 1 — Selected energy-related indicators, 2006 (Eurostat 2008, EEA 2008, APA 2008a) 
Indicator (2006) Portugal UE-27 
Primary energy intensity (goe/€ GDP) 225 202 
Energy intensity (2001 = 100%) 98% 94% 
Energy intensity (1992 = 100%) 100% 80% 
GHG emissions above Kyoto target (% over 1990 baseline) 13 1 
Energy dependency (%) 83 54 
Electricity consumption increase 2001-2006 (%.year-1) 3.7 1.6 
GDP increase at constant prices 2001-2006 (%.year-1) 0.8 1.9 
 
Improvement of Portuguese energy intensity between 2001 and 2006 was only 2% 
(the EU-27 improved 6% in the same period, despite difficulties in the new member 
states). From 1992 to 2006, Portugal kept the same energy intensity (the EU-27 
improved 20% in the same period). By 2006 Portugal had greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions 40% above 1990 levels, instead of the committed 27%, one of the worst 
record in Europe. In the period 2001-2006 electricity consumption grew four times 
faster than GDP (at constant prices; it lowered in 2007 and 2008, mostly due to the 
economic crisis, but is expected to rise again if no structural changes are achieved). 
This situation is the result of an almost absence of modern energy policies since the 
first oil shock in 1973 (only for brief periods, 1987-1991 and 2001-2002, were there 
significant efforts by the Government to create coherent energy policies). Almost all 
the energy policy and planning efforts in the past three decades have been directed 
towards alternative energy production sources, both fossil fuels (e.g. natural gas) and 
renewable (e.g. wind). 
Energy efficiency has improved significantly in the industry in the past decades, due 
to cost-effective saving measures and the shut down of some large, obsolete 
industrial plants; it represents now 31% of final consumption. On the other hand, 
energy efficiency went from bad to worse in the transportation and the 
buildings/services sectors, which now represent respectively 38% and 31% of final 
consumption. The problem in transportation is a systematic policy in favour of 
motorways and private cars, with low investment on railway, logistics, multi-modality 
and public transportation. The issues in the buildings/services are bad architecture 
and construction (leading to a disproportionate energy consumption in climatization), 
low use of distributed renewables (e.g. solar collectors and firewood) and lack of 
demand-side energy management. 
The European Union is now calling for 20% energy savings by the year 2020. Energy 
savings potential in Portugal, applying currently available technology, is estimated at 
between 30% and 40% of present consumption. Studies both at sector level and at 
company and household levels (e.g. BSCD Portugal 2005, Melo 2001, PCM 2008) 
indicate that savings of about 10% of present consumption can be achieved with 
relatively modest investments and payback periods up to 4 years. Much larger 
savings can be achieved with larger investments and payback periods, but those will 
need significant economic incentives to succeed. 
The demonstrated potential for electricity savings amounts to about 30% of electricity 
consumption. Of this, measures allowing savings of at least 6% of electricity 
consumption (1.3% of total final energy demand) are achievable with an investment 
of less than 400 M€ and pay-back periods up to 3 years; measures allowing savings 
of 25% of total electricity consumption (6% of total final energy demand) imply an 
investment of 3 500 M€ with pay-back periods up to 6 years (Madeira and Melo 
2003). 
Portugal approved its first National Program for Climate Change (PNAC) in 2004, 
reviewed in 2006 (PCM 2006). The program calls for a significant increase in energy 
production, especially in the electricity sector, which represents about 23% of final 
energy consumption and 38% of primary energy use. 
The recent National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (PNAEE: PCM 2008) sets out a 
number of measures to improve energy efficiency. Most measures are clearly 
positive, but the overall target is only 10% savings in seven years — a very low 
ambition, considering the existing potential. The plan does not make an estimate for 
overall investment cost, although it does show interesting payback periods for many 
of the measures. Fiscal incentives are set out in the program, but no overall estimate 
is provided. The Fund for Energy Efficiency will create direct public financing 
amounting to 30 M€/year — a ridiculously low figure when compared with the 
predicted investments in major public works. 
Table 2 compares selected economic indicators and effects on energy balance and 
environment impacts, of selected energy policy options. 
Table 2 — Effects of selected energy and transports policy options 
Policy option 
Energy balance 








Environmental and social impact 
Electricity production 
in new large dams (a) +1% 3 000 70 
Very negative: major protected habitat 
destruction, high risks, flooding of 
unique landscapes and heritage 
3rd road crossing of 
Tagus at Lisbon (b) + 1% 700 40 
Very negative: new air pollution, GHG 
emissions, disincentive to public 
transportation and to urban renewal 
- 10% 2 500 ≤ 4 Efficient use of 
energy, all sectors (c) - 30% unknown ≤ 10 
Very positive: major savings in fossil 
fuel imports and polluting emissions 
- 1.3% 400 ≤ 3 Efficient use of 
electricity (d) - 6% 3 500 ≤ 6 
Very positive: major savings in fossil 
fuel imports and polluting emissions 
Notes: 
(a) Estimated from INAG/DGEG/REN 2007 and published reports on the new dams; payback time 
based on concession horizon 
(b) Estimated from RAVE/Amb&Veritas 2008 and APA 2008; investment corresponds to additional 
cost of the road option on a paid-for railway bridge; payback time based on concession horizon 
(c) Estimated from BCSD Portugal 2005, the PNAEE and unpublished research at CENSE-FCT-UNL 
(d) Adapted from Madeira and Melo 2003 
(e) - represents a decrease in final energy demand. + represents an increase in final energy demand 
4. Case study: the third crossing of the Tagus at Lisbon 
The third crossing of the Tagus at Lisbon (TTT) is set out in the Regional Land Use 
Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (PROTAML: PCM 2002). It was defined as a 
rail-and-road corridor between Chelas (in Lisbon) and Barreiro, with clear priority 
attributed to the rail component: Lisbon lacks an efficient public transportation 
system, suffers from too much car traffic and already has two road bridges crossing 
the Tagus estuary. 
The proposed new bridge is to support the high-speed rail link Lisbon-Madrid, plus 
suburban and heavy cargo trains. By 2007, the Portuguese Government decided to 
add the road component immediately, supposedly to improve mobility at the Tagus 
crossings and to provide access to the new airport (that should be built near 
Alcochete, on the southern bank of the Tagus). 
The TTT project was subject to environmental impact assessment, but only the 
location and technical solution previously approved by the Government were put up 
for public consultation (RAVE/Am&Veritas 2008, APA 2008b, MAOTDR 2009a). 
Studies for detailed project are on going. 
Before, during and after public consultation the TTT project was much criticised. The 
need for the rail components is consensual; critics on this component focused on the 
lack of study of location and tunnel options (that might cause lower environmental 
and social impacts) and on the absence of an overall public transportation strategy 
for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. 
The road component suffered substantiated, violent criticism, on several counts: 
a) The increase in road traffic caused by the new crossing will provoke a 
significant degradation of air quality and noise in Lisbon, with serious 
consequences on public health. The environmental impact statement (EIS) 
tried to understate this very serious impact by underestimating the traffic 
increase and ignoring health consequences. Some air quality stations in 
Lisbon already show more than 30 days a year beyond acceptable pollution 
levels. The second road crossing, the Vasco da Gama bridge, generated a 
traffic increase of 23% of total Tagus crossings within two years of its 
inauguration (CCRLVT 2000). It is almost certain that the third road crossing 
will have a similar effect. Besides the health problems due to added air 
pollution and noise in downtown Lisbon, this means an increase of 6% of total 
traffic in Lisbon, that corresponds by itself to an increase of between 0.5% and 
1% of total energy demand and GHG emissions of Portugal; 
b) Acessibility from Barreiro to Lisbon will of course improve. But, contrary to 
what is alleged in the EIS, the new road link will not significantly improve 
mobility in the region, and is certain to disrupt urban and land use planning at 
Barreiro and other southern bank municipalities. Experience shows that new 
radial motorways accelerate urban dispersion and promote individual 
transport, creating a strong disincentive to public transportation (CCRLVT 
2000). The marginal positive effect on the 25 Abril bridge will be eroded by the 
increased traffic congestion in Lisbon. Public transportation options would 
have a far better effect at a fraction of the cost; 
c) One of the supposed reasons for the third road crossing, the access to the 
new airport, is plainly false: the existing Vasco da Gama bridge is closer, is 
being used at a quarter of its capacity, so it will support easily the road link 
between Lisbon and the new airport for twenty or thirty years, as is clearly 
stated in official reports (LNEC 2008); 
d) Considering, for the sake of the argument, the rail components as good and 
acquired, the added cost of the road component would still be high — 
estimates vary between 500 and 800 M€. Lusoponte, the concessionary of the 
existing two bridges, holds the monopoly on any road crossings in the Tagus 
estuary. The implication is that no project-finance is possible for the road 
component: investment on a third road crossing will have to paid in full by the 
Portuguese State (i.e. the taxpayers) and offered to Lusoponte to charge more 
tolls. The third road crossing will in fact preclude public investment on public 
transportation (e.g. the expansion of the Lisbon Underground and the MST, 
the tramway network of the southern bank). As a term of comparison, the 
existing 19 km of the first phase of the MST cost less than 100 M€, and this 
project is eleven years behind the original schedule. 
In short, the TTT is an unsustainable project. Its railway component has clear merits 
but needs further study; its road component is socially harmful (degrading public 
health and impeding mobility and urban renewal), environmentally harmful 
(increasing energy consumption and air pollution) and economically a disaster. 
5. Case study: the promotion of large dams 
For half a century the Portuguese Government has promoted the construction of 
dams. Current inventory runs at 165 large dams (CNPGB 2009) and many more 
small ones. By 2006, installed hydropower capacity in Portugal had reached 5.1 GW 
(Eurostat 2008). In the past decade, however, several proposed dams were refused 
or postponed, due to economic or environmental problems. Especially notorious was 
the suspension of the Foz Côa dam in 1995, due to the discovery of unique 
paleolithic rock engravings. 
In 2004 the Portuguese Government approved the first large dam in years, the Baixo 
Sabor. This project raised a huge polemic, because it destroys one the most 
beautiful, last wild rivers in Portugal, straddling a Natura 2000 site (Figure 1). DG 
Environment of the European Commission kept an open conflict file for years, which 
was recently archived due to political pressures from the Portuguese Government 
and the Commission. Lawsuits are pending in the Courts against the project. 
 
Figure 1 — The lower Sabor valley 
Two already approved new dams, Baixo Sabor and Ribeiradio, together with the re-
equipment of several old dams (under project or construction), will push Portuguese 
hydropower capacity to about 5.9 GW. 
In 2007 the Government created the National Program for Large Hydropower Dams 
(PNBEPH: INAG/DGEG/REN 2007). The central goal of this program is to create an 
additional hydropower capacity of 1.1 GW, to reach a total of 7 GW by 2020. Two 
major reasons were alleged to advocate the program: (i) to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by “renewable” electricity production; and (ii) to balance the national 
electric system taking into account wind and thermal production. The program report 
reviewed 25 proposed new dam sites and selected 10 that together comply with the 
predefined target. A strategic environmental assessment was conducted, that 
identified the key environmental and social issues, but failed on a number of counts, 
being criticized by several institutions (e.g. GEOTA 2007): 
a) Sustainability (social, ecological, economic) of the 1.1 GW target was not 
assessed; 
b) Alternatives for major aims (GHG reduction and balance of the electric 
network) were not identified or assessed; 
c) Cumulative impacts were not studied, namely: (i) increased risks for river-side 
populations; (ii) cumulative degradation of river habitats resulting from several 
dams in the same basin, especially in the Tagus and Douro basins and the 
Tâmega sub-basin; (iii) added risks of coastal erosion (30% of the Portuguese 
coastline is threatened by erosion, one of the causes being retention of 
sediments by dams). 
A thorough analysis shows that new large dams represent a very damaging and cost-
ineffective way to fulfil the proposed goals. 
The 12 new large dams (the 10 in the PNBEPH plus Baixo Sabor and Ribeiradio) 
represent a power capacity of 1 340 MW and an average electricity production of 
1.9 TWh/year. This corresponds respectively to about 8% of total currently installed 
capacity, 4% of total electricity production, and 1% of total energy demand in 
Portugal. In other words, the national relevance of the whole large dam program is 
minimal. In the period 2001-2006 electricity demand grew 4% per year: the large dam 
program is worth no more than a year of business as usual increase in consumption! 
Experience has shown that priority investment in large production projects precludes 
investment in energy conservation. 
The 12 proposed large dams will imply an investment of about 3 000 M€, with 
concession horizons of up to 75 years. In comparison, energy savings potential in 
Portugal, with current technology, is estimated at over 30% of total energy demand; 
the best 2 500 M€ investments in energy-saving projects (all sectors) would mean a 
cut about 10% in total energy demand and in total GHG emissions, with payback 
periods up to 4 years (Table 2). In the electric sector, the best 2.3 TWh/year savings 
(corresponding to 6% of electricity demand, considerably more than the whole dam 
program) would implicate the investment of less than 400 M€ with payback times up 
to 3 years (Table 2) — a much better performance than dams. In short, trying to 
reduce GHG emissions with dams is ineffective and makes no economic sense. 
It is a fact that large hydropower facilitates the operation of electric networks. Three 
issues are at stake here: 
a) Peak power. This is a real problem, but one that can be significantly minimized 
by demand management. If total electricity consumption were to be cut by 
10%, with specific measures to reduce peak power (e.g. condensers to reduce 
reactive energy in industry, passive climatization in buildings), existing 
hydropower would be quite enough; 
b) Balancing the system with wind and thermal power. This means having 
hydropower plants with pumping ability. Total needs for this purpose have 
been estimated by Portuguese officials at about 1.6 GW (in public hearings: 
no proper studies are available). We already have an installed pumping 
capacity of 1.05 GW (Eurostat 2008), which will increase to 1.3 GW with the 
on-going upgrade of the Alqueva power plant. If proved necessary, several 
options exist for the remainder, that were not studied in the PNBEPH: e.g. 
further re-equipment of existing dams, storage in electric cars, production of 
hydrogen; 
c) With climate change on our doorstep, it is not a good idea to depend too much 
on water storage for electricity (EEA 2009). It is much more intelligent to start 
being efficient now — especially since investments in energy efficiency are so 
much more interesting than large dams, economically, ecologically and 
socially. 
When we look at ecologic and social impacts, the implications of these large dams 
are equally appalling: 
a) Large dams are notorious for irreversible ecosystem destruction (EEB/WWF 
2009). Of the 12 referred dams, only Baixo Sabor is within a Natura 2000 site, 
but most of the others also have significant deleterious effects on the 
environment (CPPE/Ecossistema 2003, IA 2004, EDP/Profico Ambiente 
2008); 
b) Historically, dams have often proved ineffective in promoting local 
development (WCD 2000). In Portugal, many old large dams are located in 
some of the poorest regions in the country; very few promoted any meaningful 
local development; in some (e.g. Vilarinho das Furnas) conflicts subsist to this 
day between dislodged inhabitants and the Portuguese State. Many of the 
dams in the PNBEPH have met with frontal opposition of local populations and 
authorities, because they represent unacceptable risks, because they disrupt 
an established way of life, or because they impede real local development 
projects. The municipalities of Abrantes and Constância (affected by the 
Almourol dam), Amarante (affected by the Fridão dam) and Mirandela 
(affected by the Foz Tua dam) are the most notorious opposers to the 
Government plans, although many others have raised objections. The impact 
assessment of the Foz Tua dam (the most advanced of the 10, recently 
approved) shows profound social impacts (APA 2009): among many other 
values, the fantastic Tua valley railway is to be partly flooded and put out of 
service, and plans for local development are put in jeopardy; the social effects 
of the project are dramatically illustrated in the recently featured movie “Pare, 
Escute, Olhe” directed by Jorge Pelicano; the final decision on the dam 
(MAOTDR 2009b) blithely disregards local as well as national concerns. 
In short, the large dam policy is completely unsustainable: it is socially harmful 
(impeding local development projects and destroying unique heritage), 
environmentally harmful (destroying rare river ecosystems) and economically 
wasteful, there being better alternatives to fulfil the proposed goals. 
6. Conclusion 
The decision process in the examined case studies (third crossing of the Tagus at 
Lisbon and promotion of new large dams) was found to be aprioristic and with little 
attention to public participation. 
The purported goals are barely achieved or in some cases are contradicted by the 
proposed public works. We find that, although technical information is abundant, the 
political decisions are often not supported by sound technically reasoning. We find 
moreover that the financial equation is, to say the least, uninteresting for the 
Portuguese Sate. 
The Government sees as a great virtue of the proposed works, the commissions and 
employment in the construction business, deeply affected by the economic crisis; but 
even on this count, it can be argued, there are more interesting alternatives (e.g. 
public transportation or urban renewal projects). 
In short, despite the rhetoric, public works in Portugal remain as unsustainable as 
ever, on all the three domains: environment, society and economy. 
If we want sustainability to be a reality, we should be prepared to fight for it, because, 
despite the economic and ecologic crises, too many interests are willing to fight for 
the unsustainable business as usual. 
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